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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Yet it may not be too presumptuous to conclude that no test
truly superior to those already devised will be forthcoming until
the various schools of psychiatry reach substantial agreement
among themselves as to the meaning of their own terminology so
that laws and decisions made in recognition thereof will become
capable of practical and efficient administration.
J. A. Guzzetta
INCOME TAXATION OF COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS
TWTRODUCTIOir
"Collapse" concerns the practice whereby the dissolution of
a corporation or partnership is availed of as a means to the trans-
formation of ordinary income into long term capital gain. The
technique would be inconsequential but for the attractiveness of
the capital gain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Desire
to convert ordinary income into long term capital gain with re-
sultant preferential tax treatment has been almost boundless.1
Development of the concept of collapse was but the outgrowth of
the discovery of defects in the tax structure of the 1939 Code which
paved the way for such conversions. Subsequent additions and
amendments to the 1939 Code served in some measure to plug the
existing loopholes in the area of corporate taxation. The 1954 Code
has to a degree strengthened the collapsible corporation provisions
of the prior law, and in addition, has introduced loophole plugging
provisions aimed at the prevention of the use of the collapsible
partnership as a device to attain the same end.2 Although the
effectiveness of such provisions awaits judicial expression, interim
analysis of the statute would not be inappropriate.
EARLY DVELOPME-NT OF COLLAPSE
Prior to the effective date of Section 117(m) of the 1939 Code,
a corporation holding appreciated property, but which had not
yet realized taxable gain, had available two procedures whereby
it could benefit its stockholders at capital gain rates by the amount
of the appreciation without incurring to itself adverse tax con-
sequences. The corporation could distribute to its shareholders
1. Murphy, Sale of a Sole Proprietorship--An Irrationale in Three Parts, 9 TAX
L. R -. 309. 310 (1953).
2. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1954). Space limitations prevent
consideration of the collapsible partnership; but note herein INT. Ray. CODE oF 1954, §§ 741
and 751, in effect supplanting G. C. M. 26379, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 58.
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the proceeds of a loan secured by the appreciated property,' or it
could dissolve and distribute its property in kind as a liquidating
dividend.4 Such distribution could not be said to confer taxable
gain upon the corporation. The corporation which had not real-
ized income on the distribution in kind of these appreciated assets
would pay no tax on the amount of the appreciation.0 The share-
holder would pay capital gain tax on the liquidating dividend,
which tax was applied to the excess of fair market value of the
property so distributed over the cost basis of the stock. The
appreciated assets taken in liquidation had a stepped-up cost
basis, i. e., fair market value at the time of the distribution. Sub-
sequent realization of proceeds from these assets resulted in little
if any gain, assuming the sale price was equivalent to the fair
market value.
Use of the collapsible corporation especially was suited to
joint venture types of enterprise. Effective adaptation of the
device was made in the building construction industry; later in
the motion picture industry.7 While the publicity given the use
of the device in the latter area served in no small measure to
hasten the enactment of the collapsible corporation statute," it
may well be that the more extensive use of the practice of collapse
was made-and possibly unwittingly still is being made-in the
building construction industry.
To illustrate, a real estate development corporation would be
formed to construct a housing project. Upon completion of the
same, and before any sales and leases were made, the corporation
would be liquidated and dissolved, and the assets would be dis-
tributed to the shareholders. They would report as long term
capital gain the difference between the original cost of the stock
and the value of the assets received, the latter figure representing
their proportionate share of the value of the completed product.
Then, owning the property individually, with a stepped-up cost
basis, they would sell at a price comparable to the stated value
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(d), 53 STAT. 47 (now INqT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§301(c) (3)) ; but note also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 311(c), conferring a tax lia-
bility upon the corporate distributor for transfers made during taxable years ending
after June 22, 1954. Cf. also Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E. 2d 43 (1942).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §115(c), 53 STAT. 46 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 302(a)).
5. General Utilities and Operating Company v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935).
6. Commissioner v. Estate of Timken, 141 F. 2d 625, (6th Cir. 1944); see also
Miller, Capital Gain Taxation Under the Revenue Act of 1950, N. Y.U. 9Th INST. ON
FED. TAx. 675 (1951).
7. H. R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), as in 1950-2 Cum. BuLL.
380, 422.
8. See PAuL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES, c. 8 (1953); also Bittker and
Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437 (1949) and
especially Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (1952).
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of the completed product. Gain at this stage, if any, would be
ordinary income. If the project were financed by a mortgage
loan, one which proved to be in excess of the estimated cost of
construction, monies so distributed to shareholders without sur-
render of their stock would accomplish much the same purpose
as collapse itself.9
The response of the Commissioner served to illustrate the
various avenues of attack available to the Government as it at-
tempted to meet the problem. In Gilman. v. Commissioner,0 the
Commissioner not only paid high regard to the corporate entity,
but in a sense, he tried to extend its de facto existence in order
to attribute to the corporation the sale of the assets." Yet, in
Herbert v. Riddell,'2 he attempted to disregard the corporate en-
tity as a mere sham, and to tax the profits as ordinary income
to the shareholders.13 The Commissioner also might argue that
any income so realized by the former shareholders from the cor-
porate assets should be allocable to the corporation under Section
45 of the 1939 Code. Such, of course, would involve acceptance
of the corporate being, and attribution to it of the realized pro-
ceeds as ordinary income under the familiar "fruit of the tree"
argument.' 4 Furthermore, argument could be advanced that gain
realized on liquidation or sale is to be taxed to the shareholder
as ordinary income representing compensation for services ren-
dered, to the extent the reasonable value of such services exceeds
amounts actually received as salary during the corporate exist-
ence.'
5
CuRATIVE LEGISLATIOo
Despite the availability of the above, Congress passed curative
legislation.' 6 The result was Section 212(a) of the Revenue Act
9. Supra note 3. For more on this, see Greenfield, Effect of Collapsible Cor-
poration Provisions on Real Property Holdings, N. Y. U. 10TH INsT. oN FED. TAX. 91
(1951) and Freeman, Collapsible Corporations, N. Y. U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 407
408 (1952).
10. 14 T. C. 833 (1950).
11. Such would not be unlike the ruling in Commissioner v. Court Holding Com-
pany, 324 U. S. 331 (1945) ; but cf. United States v. Cumberland Public Service Coln-
pony, 338 U.S. 45 (1950).
12. Supra note 8.
13. The personal service aspect there may well provide reason for the attempt
to add directly to the individual's tax burden. Freeman, supra note 9, at 417. Argument
that the corporate entity should be disregarded since it was but a conduit to transform
ordinary income into long term capital gain, serving no true business purpose, was
approved recently in Jacobs v. Coinnissioner, 21 T. C. 165, 169 (1953).
14. Cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
15. Generally, see 3 MmERaNs, FEDER.AL INcOME TAXATION 370 (Supp. 1954).
16. The statute was drafted before the Gilman case was reported in May 1950.
H. R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 7, at 451, theorized that it was uncertain whether or
(Footnote continued on following page.)
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of 1950, embodied in the 1939 Code as Section 117(m). It was
estimated that the plugging of the loophole would "produce ap-
proximately $3 million additional revenue annually". 1'7 Within a
year it was noted that the technique of collapse was used elsewhere
than in the two areas noted, and that Section 117(m) would have
to be amended to meet the situation where inventory profits were
converted into capital gains, chiefly within the whiskey industry.
Thus, Section 326 of the Revenue Act of 1951 was added to Section
117(m) of the 1939 Code.18 Such was calculated to add another
$5 million to Treasury coffers.1 9 Section 117(m) of the 1939 Code
as amended, has been embodied in Section 341 of the 1954 Code. Its
basic provisions have been retained,'2 0 along with important addi-
tions and some minor changes attempting to strengthen the overall
effectiveness of the law with regard to sales, exchanges, and dis-
tributions executed on or after June 22, 1954.
Although the statute was enacted in 1950, the first proposed
United States Treasury Regulations did not appear until October,
1952, and they were not officially issued until the following March.21
The regulations, somewhat vague and confusing, illustrate the
difficulty of concise definition and/or explanation of the statute.
It might also be noted that the proposed regulations to the 1954
Code essentially merely echo the statements in the prior regu-
lations.2"
Section 341(d) (1) of the 1954 Code reduced the requisite
holdings of a shareholder from more than 10% in value of the
outstanding corporate stock to but more than 57 in value of such
stock. By far the most important addition is Section 341(c)
providing for a rebuttable presumption that a corporation is
collapsible if certain conditions are found to exist. Sections
341(b) (3) and (4) merely set out what assets are to be considered
in ascertaining the aforementioned conditions. These provisions,
along with Section 341(a) (3) regarding a distribution not in
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
not use of the device would be favorably viewed by the courts. In view of such un-
certainty, the committee felt that a specific statute dealing with collapsible corporations
"is desirable . . . to insure that the use of the device in the future will result in no
tax advantage". (emphasis added.)
17. Id. at 423.
18. H. R. REP. No. 586, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), as in 1951-2 Cum. BULL.
357, 375.
19. S. REP. No. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), as in 1951-2 CuM. BULL. 458 ff.
20. Retention was had by the Senate which did not approve of the plan submitted
by the House. See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 2, at 48.
21. As noted by MacLean, Collapsible Corporations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 55 (1954);
also Greenfield, supra note 9, at 98 and comments by Freeman, supra note 9, at 417.
22. Compare prior U. S. TREAs. REG. 118, § 39.117(m) with proposed U. S.
TREAs. REG. § 1.341.
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liquidation and not a dividend,23 constitute the only major addi-
tions in the new statute to Section 117(m) of the prior statute.
Generally, gain realized from the sale or exchange of stock,
from distributions in liquidation, or from distributions of proceeds
of loans in excess of the bases of the property by which they are se-
cured will, in the case of a collapsible corporation, be treated as or-
dinary income as regards a shareholder owning more than 5% of
the outstanding stock of the corporation, provided that the gain re-
alized is more than 70% attributable to the property of the corpo-
ration, and that such gain is realized within three years following
the completion of the manufacture of such property.2 Three mat-
ters ought to be noted. First, the corporation need not, in fact, col-
lapse, for the statute to apply. A sale of stock in a collapsible corpo-
ration may suffice.25  The breadth of the statute is likewise il-
lustrated by provision that gain from distributions by collapsible
corporations of the proceeds of loans had in excess of the bases
of the appreciated property by which they are secured will not
receive capital gain preference.28  Such, of course, leads to the
final consideration of what is a collapsible corporation. The
statute defines it as one
formed or availed of principally for the manufacture . . . of
property . . . with a view to the sale or exchange of stock...
or a distribution to its shareholders, before the realization by
the corporation . . . of a substantial part of the taxable income
to be derived from such property, and the realization by such
shareholders of gain attributable to such property.2 7
It should be recognized that Section 341 of the 1954 Code has
clarified to a great degree the prior subjectivity of Section 117(m)
of the 1939 Code by providing that a corporation will be deemed
to be collapsible if certain objectively ascertainable standards are
in evidence.28 If the fair market value of the "section 341 assets"
(generally non-capital assets, including unrealized receivables and
fees) 29 which are held for less than three years30 is 50% or more
23. Formerly INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1939, § 115(d), 53 STAT. 47 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954 §301(C)).
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 341 (a) & (d).
25. Ibid., see also comment in MacLean, mtpra, note 21.
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(a) (3), with reference to § 301(c) (3) (A).
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b).
28. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 34 1 (c), in effect an affirmance of Freeman, supra
note 9, at 447.
29. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 2, at 260 points out that such assets generally
will include inventories plus property described in Section 1231(b) of the 1954 Code
(old Section 117(j)), except that it will exclude property which is or has been used
in connection with the manufacture of other Section 341 assets as inventory or property
held primarily for sale to customers.
30. Id., pointing out that reference should be had to Section 1223 of the 1954
Code and that the holding period will not begin until completion of the "manufacture"
of the property.
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of the total corporate assets, excluding cash, stock holdings, and
obligations defined in Section 341(c) (2) (B) ; and the appreciated
value of such is 120% or more of their adjusted base, the cor-
poration is deemed to be collapsible 1
The presumption apparently is a procedural aid for the Com-
missioner. If the aforementioned conditions exist, the burden
of going forward with the evidence will shift to the taxpayer.
Absence of conditions giving rise to the presumption will not give
rise to the converse. 2 Hence, a corporation still could be found
collapsible without resort to the presumption. Presence of con-
ditions leading to the operation of the presumption merely allows
the Commissioner to sidestep the necessity of proving a corpora-
tion collapsible by resort to the weasel wording of Section 341(b).83
The collapsible corporation is one principally engaged in the
manufacture of property "with a view to" certain specified dis-
positions. The statute does little to qualify the noun "view".
The term "principally" appears out of position to modify it.
There is no reference to "the view", or "principal view", or even
"substantial view'" 4 The statute merely refers to "a view".
Since the phrase does refer to the subjective intent of the agents
of the corporation, it is clear that the requirement of the existence
of "a view" rather than the above mentioned possibilities, lessens
appreciably the burden of proof upon the Commissioner. The
Commissioner's regulations in proposed form take full advantage
of this. They state that:
the existence of a bona fide business reason for doing business
in the corporate form does not, by itself, negate the fact that
the corporation may also have been formed or availed of with
a view to the action described in section 341(b) .3
To further "clarify" the meaning of the term in question, the
Regulations provide that:
this requirement is satisfied in any case in which such action
was contemplated by those persons in a position to determine the
policies of the corporation, whether by reason of their owning a
majority of the voting stock of the corporation or otherwise.
31. Id., at 261, the Committee states that "it is intended that if either of the con-
ditions described are not met a presumption that the corporation is not a collapsible
corporation shall not arise".
32. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954 § 341(c) (1). Also, supra note 31.
33. Much of the weasel wording of the statute has been adequately commented
upon by others, e.g. Freeman, supra note 9, and MacLean, supra note 21, and will not
be considered at length here.
34. MacLean, supra note 21, at 60.
35. Proposed U. S. TREAs. RaG. § 1.341-2(2).
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The requirement is satisfied whether such action was contem-
plated unconditionally, conditionally, or as a recognizedpossibil-
ity.m6 [Emphasis added.]
The requisite view need not be in existence at the time of the
formation of the corporation. The statute is read with the phrase
"with a view to" modifying generally the phrase "formed or
availed of principally". Hence, the new proposed regulations
provide only that the view needs exist at any time during the
manufacture.3 7 The Commissioner condescended to provide that
if the sale or distribution is necessitated solely by circumstances
arising after the manufacture, the corporation shall be considered
not to have been so formed or availed of. Yet, he qualifies this
by providing that such circumstances must not have been reason-
ably anticipated at or during manufacture, and he also provides
that such conclusion, i. e., not collapsible, will be reached only in
the "absence of compelling facts to the contrary' .
The statute requires the corporation be principally engaged
in the manufacture of property with the necessary view to transfer
or collapse before it realizes a "substantial part" of the net income
to be derived from such propery. 9  Clearly, "substantial" can
not be blessed with any precise meaning in the abstract. More-
over, it appears that the proposed regulations equate "substan-
tial" with "principally ' 40 which may be viewed as being contrary
to the intent of the draftsmen. If one accepts the premise that
"principally" means something more than "substantial", it can
be argued that the consequence of the equation is to weaken the
meaning of the term "principally", to the resultant benefit of the
Commissioner. The 70% rule in Section 341 (d) (2) is illuminat-
ing. The House Committee has reported that:
Both the second and third limitations relate to the gain real-
ized from the sale or exchange of stock, the second limitation
being designed to insure that the application of the subsection
will be limited to 'those corporations where the relationship be-
tween the gain realized and the property manufactured, con-
structed, or produced is substantial.41
36. Ibid.
37. Id. § 1.341-2(3).
38. Ibid. For illustration, see § 1.341-5, ex. #3.
39. Once it is determined that the corporation itself has realized a substantial part
of such taxable income to be derived from its property, it will be deemed an ordinary
business corporation and all other considerations become "academic". (Freeman, Vtpra
note 9. at 428.)
40. See proposed U. S. TREAs. REG. § 1.341-5(b) (3); and MacLean, supra note
21, at 71.
41. H. R. REP. 2319, supra note 7, at 451.
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This is the strongest official indication that the 70% requirement
is to be cross-referenced -with the term under consideration. In
any event, it still is unclear as to where between 107 and 70%
the minimum is reached which will satisfy the Commissioner as
to what is "substantial .42
LnrrATioxs
Although a corporation be collapsible in all respects, gain
had by a shareholder still may be long term capital gain if the
shareholder in question did not own or was not considered as
owning more than 5% in value of the total outstanding stock of
the corporation.
If the corporation be collapsible, and if the particular share-
holder own or is considered as owning the requisite amount of
stock, the applicability of the statute can be avoided if it can be
shown that at least 30% of the gain realized in any taxable year
on a distribution from the corporation or on a sale or other dis-
position of the stock is not attributable to the property so produced
by the corporation. Basically, this is an all or nothing approach.
43
It is of course conjectural as to how the Commissioner and courts
ultimately will view the term " I attributable I Y.4
Finally, even if the corporation be collapsible, even if the
particular shareholder does own the requisite amount of stock,
and the gain from the stockholding is more than 70% attributable
to the property produced, the effect of the statute can be avoided
if such gain is "realized after the expiration of three years fol-
lowing the completion of such manufacture. " 4 It has been
rather strongly suggested that this limitation may well be one
42. It can be implied from proposed U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-5, ex. #4 that
10% is not to be regarded as "substantial". See also comment by MacLean, supra note
21, at 70, and cf. Boland, Practical Problems of the Collapsible Corporation, N. Y. U.
10TH INsT. o N FED. TAx. 536 (1951). The former also makes the point that under
the peculiar wording of the statute such realization, or lack of it, need not in fact
occur. All that may be required he submits, is that a vie-w to such be present at some
time or other. Such lends added meaning to the phrase "with a view to". Hence, even
if a corporation has realized such a "substantial" part of the income, it is conceivable,
though highly improbable, that the statute could apply. However, the author appears
to agree with Freeman, supra note 9, that the above is mere academic speculation.
43. Cohen, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of the
Sale of a Business Enterprise-A. L. I. Draft, 54 COL. L. REv. 157, 172 (1954).
44. The proposed Treasury Regulations are of little aid here. (See § 1.341-4.)
An example of possible application of the 70% rule is provided in 2 CCH 1955 STAND.
FED. TAx REP.
2490 Greenfield, mpra note 9, comments that in re: real estate development sales,
the limitation might apply if 30% of the gain be attributable merely to the appreciation
in value of the land.
45. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(d) (3). Also H. R. REP. No. 2319, supra note
7, at 451. The computation of the period is to begin at the time of the completion of
the manufacture, not the time of the sale or distribution.
332
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of the major loopholes allowing for circumvention of the statute.4 6
The procedure calls for patience and delay; for an ability to forego
immediate use of funds in anticipation of the capital gain benefits
later to arise. The corporation could enter into executory con-
tracts to sell with a closing set after the statutory period. Pos-
sibly an interim leasehold arrangement also could be utilized.
Co-NLJSION
While the extent to which the concept of collapse in the area
of corporate taxation has been arrested by the statute must await
judicial expression, the writer believes that reference to the limi-
tations considered above well may allow tax counsel to mold the
structure of newly formed corporations in such manner as to avoid
entirely the scope and application of the statute. Certainly the
statute will serve as a deterrent, and its provisions must be heeded
in any situation where capital gain is anticipated from a sale or
distribution. Generally, inspection of the corporate balance sheet
should suffice to ascertain whether or not a corporation is col-
lapsible. If the presumption that the corporation is collapsible
does not apply to the situation at hand, the ordinary taxpayer
need entertain no fears. Undoubtedly, it will be a rare case where
attempt is made to apply the statute without aid of the pre-
sumption.
Due to the three year property holding provision in the pre-
sumption and the statements in the proposed regulations regarding
prior business histories, it appears that the brunt of the statute
is intended to be borne by newly organized corporations. More-
over, because of the general appreciation in values attending an
inflationary period, the presumption may well prove most valuable
to the Commissioner during such a stage in the business cycle as
the present. While it does not appear that the overall effect of
the statute may be to stifle investment tainted with hopes of speedy
rewards, still it is conceivable that attacks by the Commissioner
based upon Section 341 may increase or decrease, through design
or otherwise, during the fluctuations of the over all business
economy.
It is uncertain whether or not the other avenues of approach
to the problem, such as those developed in the Gilmaj 7 and
Herbert4 cases, still are available to the Commissioner. The
writer does not believe the statute to be preemptory. Had Con-
46. Cohen, supra note 43, at 174 if, pointing out it never would reach LIFO in-
ventories where ordinary gain has been deferred for more than 3 years. See also Note,
Legislative Response to the Collapsible Corporation, 51 CoL. L. Rxv. 361 (1951).
47. Supra note 10.
48. Supra note 8.
333
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gress intended Section 341 to preempt the available avenues of
attack upon the collapsible corporation, it is submitted that it
would have inserted statutory language to that effect, similar to
that inserted in Section 671 of the Clifford Trust provisions of
the 1954 Code.
Irwin E. Ginsberg
USE OF MANDAMUS TO REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTIONS IN NEW YORK
INTRODUCTION
The growth in number and in influence of administrative
bodies in the past few decades has resulted in an ever increasing
body of litigation in which those who believe themselves wronged
by governmental agencies seek redress in the courts. The extra-
ordinary remedy of mandamus has proved to be a convenient de-
vice for obtaining judicial review in many cases.
Although the common law writ of mandamus has been abol-
ished in New York the relief formerly obtainable under that
writ is available under the statutory substitute.' While the
statute has achieved the salutary effect of eliminating the danger
of an incorrect selection among the extraordinary remedies it has
been recognized by the courts that the relief available under Article
78 of the Civil Practice Act is coextensive with that which existed
before the reformed procedure.2  For this reason no distinction
will be made between cases of mandamus and the present cases
in the nature of mandamus. The procedural consolidation has
quite understandably resulted in a diminishing use of the old
label by the courts.3 For purposes of convenience, however, the
term "mandamus" will be used indiscriminately herein to charac-
terize actions of this nature both before and after the passage
of Article 78.
TmE MA TDATORY-DIsCRETIOxARY DISTINCTION
A consideration of the factors employed by the courts in
deciding whether mandamus should be granted in a particular
case must necessarily include a mention of the most common cri-
terion used in deciding cases umder the old writ. The old theory
was that mandamus could be had only to compel performance of
1. C. P.A. § 1283.
2. Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 33 N.E. 2d 75 (1941); see
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT N. Y. JUDII.AL COUNCIL 132 (1937).
3. See Fiore v. O'Connell, 297 N. Y. 260, 78 N.E. 2d 602 (1948); Ncw York
State Soc. of Prof. Eng. v. Education Dept, 262 App. Div. 602, 31 N.Y. S. 2d (3d
Dep't 1941).
